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Introduction	
	Nearly	 ten	 years	 have	 past	 since	 the	 last	 financial	 crisis	 occurred,	 making	 it	easier	to	reflect	on	whether	the	policies	applied	by	the	Federal	Reserve,	the	Bank	of	 England	 and	 the	 ECB	 had	 the	 intended	 effect	 on	 restoring	 economic	 and	financial	stability.		While	stability	has	in	time	been	restored,	it	has	not	been	restored	for	all.	Was	it	a	stability	action	plan	for	the	banking	sector,	for	the	financial	markets	generally	or	for	the	collective	of	individual	households?		This	question	matters	as	the	possible	solutions	are	quite	different	for	each	sector	of	an	economy.		In	 a	 previous	 paper:	 “Why	 it	 makes	 economic	 sense	 to	 help	 the	 have-nots	 in	times	of	a	 financial	 crisis”	 the	author	highlighted	 three	 interrelated	 issues.	The	first	one	was	timing.	In	the	U.S.	a	(mortgage)	borrowers’	crisis	occurred	in	2003,	when	 the	 income	 and	 house	 price	 gap	 forced	 new	 borrowers	 to	 accept	 an	amount	of	a	mortgage	loan	far	exceeding	their	income	earnings	growth	over	the	period	1996-2003.	The	second	issue	was	the	macro-economic	volume	of	lending.	Between	 1996-2007	 there	 was	 a	 strong	 correlation	 between	 the	 volume	 of	mortgage	 lending	 and	 the	 increases	 in	 house	 prices	 in	 the	 U.S.	 –	 not	 wholly	surprising.	The	third	issue	was	that	mortgage	lending	volumes	were	not	kept	in	line	with	average	income	growth	over	the	period	2000-2007,	which	had	already	from	2006,	resulted	in	a	rapidly	increasing	level	of	foreclosure	filings,	completed	foreclosures	and	home	repossessions.	By	2007-2008	the	resultant	financial	crisis	had	occurred.		In	2008,	 the	 threat	 to	 the	banking	sector	 forced	central	banks	 to	come	to	 their	rescue.			The	solutions	chosen:	Liquidity	supply,	Quantitative	Easing,	lowering	of	interest	rates	 to	historical	 lows,	 reform	of	banking	supervision,	and	 legal	 reform	 in	 the	case	of	the	U.S.	in	the	shape	of	the	Dodd-Frank	Act.		The	banking	sector	and	the	financial	sector	both	benefitted	from	these	measures.	The	 collective	 of	 individual	 households	 did	 not.	 They	were	 under	 tremendous	pressure	 to	pay	back	 the	mortgage	 loans,	which	 the	U.S.	banking	sector	had	so	recklessly	 granted	 them.	 The	 lowest	 interest	 rates	 on	 record	 failed	 to	 entice	them	to	borrow	more,	neither	in	mortgages	or	consumer	loans.		This	paper	will	 look	at	what	went	wrong,	what	rescue	measures	were	adopted	and	examining	the	position	of	the	collective	households	and	borrowers	and	will	set	 out	 the	 difference	 between	 consumer	 price	 inflation	 and	 house	 price	inflation.	 The	 first	 affects	 current	 incomes,	 the	 latter	 the	 debt	 position	 of	households.		
	 4	
																																																																																																																																																																																															Central	banks	strategies	after	the	financial	crisis©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		
	
1.		Nearly	all	banks	were	rescued	in	2008	
	Whether	it	was	in	the	U.S.,	the	U.K.	or	in	Europe	under	the	guidance	of	the	ECB,	banks	 were	 rescued	 by	 the	 central	 banks	 with	 few	 exceptions.	 As	 Ben	 S.	Bernanke	described	 in	a	number	of	 lectures	about	the	Federal	Reserve	and	the	financial	crisis1,	the	response	of	the	Fed	was	to	“calm	a	financial	panic	as	a	lender	of	last	resort”.			How	did	the	U.S.	banking	system	got	into	its	liquidity	problems	in	the	first	place?	Three	developments	 can	be	highlighted.	The	 first	 one	was	 the	 rapid	 growth	of	mortgage	 lending	 in	 the	 U.S.	 over	 the	 period	 1996-2007	 and	 the	 subsequent	substantial	increases	in	house	prices.	The	second	development	was	the	softening	in	 the	 quality	 standards	 of	 the	 mortgages	 granted.	 Prior	 to	 the	 early	 2000s,	homebuyers	were	required	to	make	a	significant	down	payment	(10%	or	more)	in	order	to	obtain	a	mortgage.	They	also	had	to	provide	evidence	of	their	income	and	 assets	 situation.	 Especially	 from	 2004	 and	 later	 years,	 so-called	 subprime	mortgages	 were	 granted	 to	 households	 who	 no	 longer	 needed	 to	 provide	evidence	of	income	and	assets	(self-certification)	and	were	offered	a	much	lower	or	 even	 no	 down	 payment.	 Low	 start-up	 interest	 rates	 –below	 market	 rates-	were	also	offered	to	entice	more	borrowers.	The	third	development	was	that,	on	a	large	scale,	U.S.	 investment	banks	started	to	get	involved	in	the	U.S.	mortgage	market,	 not	 just	 by	 funding	 and	 holding	 on	 to	 mortgages	 themselves,	 but	 by	creating	 Collaterised	 Debt	 Obligations	 (CDOs)	 and	 derivative	 related	 products	which	were	 sold	 around	 the	world.	 CDOs	 had	 credit	 ratings	 attached	 to	 them	from	top	U.S.	credit	rating	agencies	which	nearly	all	turned	out	to	be	erroneous.		The	volume	of	 lending	per	 time	period,	 the	 softening	of	 lending	 standards	and	the	internationalization	of	an	initially	U.S.	domestic	product	like	home	mortgages	were	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 crisis.	 The	 fact	 was	 that	 a	 mortgage	 borrowers	 crisis	preceded	the	financial	crisis	by	some	four	years	and	the	authorities	failed	to	act	on	it.	The	fact	that	in	2006	the	level	of	foreclosure	filings	had	increased	by	65%	over	2004	did	not	prompt	to	any	discernable	action	by	the	authorities	either.	A	self-correction	 of	 a	 boom	 period	 was	 regarded	 as	 a	 healthy	 solution	 to	 an	overheated	market.	Only	when	a	serious	banking	crisis	appeared	in	2008,	were	the	authorities	minded	to	act.			The	 U.S.	 banking	 sector	 was	 ill	 prepared	 for	 a	 rapid	 increase	 in	 doubtful	mortgage	debtors.	The	most	vulnerable	were	some	of	the	big	brokerage	houses,	which,	by	2007,	had	debt	to	capital	ratios	of	32	to	12.	Also	undercapitalized	were	Freddie	Mac	and	Fannie	Mae,	state	sponsored	enterprises,	which	specialized	 in	providing	long	term	funding	for	home	mortgages.																																																											1	https://press.princeton.edu/titles/9928.html	2	https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/133337/too-big-to-fail/	
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																																																																	Central	banks	strategies	after	the	financial	crisis©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning		Lehman	 Brothers	 filed	 for	 bankruptcy	 on	 September	 15,	 2008.	With	 assets	 of	over	$600	billion	and	a	capital	base	of	only	$22.5	billion,	the	firm	was	unable	to	absorb	 the	 losses	 on	 its	 activities	 in	 the	 U.S	mortgage	markets.	 It	 became	 the	largest	bankruptcy	case	in	U.S.	history.		Fannie	 Mae	 and	 Freddie	 Mac	 were	 rescued	 in	 that	 the	 U.S.	 government	guaranteed	 their	 mortgage	 bond	 obligations.	 Many	 banks	 were	 helped	 with	liquidity	support	and	some	of	the	U.S.	brokerage	houses	were	taken	over	by	U.S.	banks;	 nearly	 all	with	 support	 from	 the	Fed.	 Even	 an	 insurance	 company,	AIG,	had	 to	 be	 rescued	 as	 they	 had	 issued	 guarantees	 and	 taken	 billions	 of	 dollars	from	 credit	 default	 swaps,	 which	 provided	 insurance	 against	 the	 failure	 of	mortgage	bonds	and	CDOs.		In	 Europe,	 on	 9th	 August	 2007,	 BNP	 Paribas	 of	 France	 announced	 that	 it	 had	stopped	 trading	 in	 three	of	 its	 investment	 funds	exposed	 to	 the	U.S.	 sub-prime	mortgage	markets	 as	 the	 liquidity	 in	 these	markets	 had	 all	 but	 dried	 up.	 This	date	is	widely	taken	as	the	starting	date	of	the	financial	crisis.		In	the	U.K.	Northern	Rock,	a	building	society,	experienced	funding	problems	for	its	mortgage	 book	 very	 soon	 after	BNP	Paribas	 announced	 its	 actions.	On	 14th	September	 2007,	 it	 had	 to	 call	 on	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 to	 ask	 for	 liquidity	support,	which	was	granted.	A	few	days	earlier,	Northern	Rock	had	experienced	a	run	on	its	branches,	the	first	ever	for	over	150	years	in	British	banking	history.	Northern	 Rock’	 balance	 sheet	 was	 unlike	 the	 one	 for	 most	 other	 building	societies	 in	 that	 it	 relied	 for	more	 than	 70%	on	wholesale	money	markets	 for	funding	 its	 mortgage	 portfolio.	 Most	 other	 U.K.	 building	 societies	 funded	themselves	mainly	through	customer	deposits;	 the	 latter	have	a	tendency	to	be	less	volatile	than	short-term	interbank	funding.	The	U.K.	government	decided	to	nationalize	Northern	Rock	on	22nd	February	2008.			Another	 building	 society,	 Bradford	 and	 Bingley,	 also	 experienced	 funding	problems	and	the	U.K.	government	took	over	the	loan	book	and	sold	the	branch	network	and	its	deposits	to	Bank	Santander	U.K.		The	bigger	problems	were	still	to	come	in	the	U.K.	in	the	form	of	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	and	Lloyds	Bank.	On	the	12th	October	2008,	both	were	taken	over	with	the	 help	 of	 some	 £50	 billion	 in	 U.K.	 taxpayers’	 money.	 Outside	 shareholders’	equity	was	nearly	all	written	off.		In	2007,	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland,	together	with	two	 other	 banks,	 had	 bought	 the	 Dutch	 bank	 ABN	 AMRO,	 paying	 in	 cash.	 The	latter	was	nearly	twice	the	size	of	RBS,	so	RBS	needed	Bank	Santander	of	Spain	and	the	Belgian	Fortis	Bank	to	help	with	the	take-over.	When	in	2008,	the	losses	accumulated	by	RBS	threatened	 its	survival,	 the	U.K.	government	stepped	 in	 to	rescue	the	U.K.	arm	while	the	Dutch,	Belgian	and	Luxembourg	operations	of	ABN	AMRO	Fortis	were	all	split	up	and	taken	over	by	their	respective	governments.				
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																																																																																																																																		Central	banks	strategies	after	the	financial	crisis©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning				In	Spain	some	of	the	Caja’s	–	savings	banks	–	suffered	financial	problems,	as	did	some	banks	in	Germany,	Iceland,	Ireland,	Portugal,	Italy	and	Greece.				In	their	 liquidity	support	actions,	 the	Fed,	 the	Bank	of	England	and	the	ECB	all	played	their	part,	not	only	 in	supporting	domestic	banks,	but	also	cross-border	through	 currency	 swaps	 as	 overseas	 banks	 and	 their	 customers	 needed	 U.S	dollars	for	their	funding.		
	
2.	How	did	the	banking	and	financial	sector	develop	after	2008?	
	Central	 bankers	 and	 governments	 were	 quite	 taken	 aback	 with	 the	 financial	market	philosophy	at	the	time.	The	bankers’	philosophy	was	that	central	banks	and	governments	would	be	drafted	in	if	banks	got	into	problems.	Some	ten	years	ago,	the	“Too	big	to	fail”	philosophy	was	strongly	prevalent.			In	 an	 extensive	 report:	 “A	 decade	 of	 change	 in	 capital	markets;	 an	 analysis	 of	what	 has	 and	hasn’t	 changed	 in	 the	 capital	markets	 industry	 since	2006”3,	 the	authors	came	to	a	number	of	conclusions:		
• The	biggest	banks	in	the	world	have	got	bigger	but	less	profitable	over	the	past	 ten	 years.	 Assets	 are	 up	 by	more	 than	 a	 quarter	 in	 real	 terms,	 but	profitability	 has	dropped	by	 a	 third.	 The	world’s	 20	biggest	 banks	have	grown	 faster,	 with	 assets	 increasing	 40%	 in	 real	 terms.	 Most	 of	 this	growth	has	been	 in	Asia,	especially	China;	 in	Europe	banks	have	shrunk	significantly	relative	to	GDP.	Banks	are	safer	and	have	more	than	twice	as	much	capital	today	(depending	on	which	measure	you	use).		
• Investment	banks	have	fared	worse	than	any	other	sector	of	the	industry	through	the	financial	crisis.	Revenues	have	dropped	by	a	third	and	pretax	profits	 have	 nearly	 halved	 in	 real	 terms,	 while	 return	 on	 equity	 has	plunged	by	more	than	two	thirds.	Costs	have	only	fallen	by	15%	and	for	all	the	job	cuts	headcount	is	only	down	by	a	few	percent.		
• The	 asset	 management	 industry	 has	 emerged	 from	 the	 financial	 crisis	relatively	 unscathed.	 Assets	 under	 management	 have	 increased	 by	 a	quarter,	 but	 outside	 of	 the	U.S,	 assets	 have	 shrunk	 relative	 to	GDP.	 The	industry	is	only	marginally	less	profitable	today	than	it	was	a	decade	ago.		 		 																																																									3	“	A	decade	of	change	in	capital	markets’	by	William	Wright	and	Panagiotis	Asimakopoulos,	September	2017,	New	Financial,	London	
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• In	virtually	every	sector	in	the	capital	markets	(most	notably	with	banks	and	in	the	corporate	bond	and	IPO	markets)	there	has	been	a	clear	shift	in	the	 balance	 of	 power	 over	 the	 past	 decade	 from	 shrinking	 markets	 in	Europe	to	faster	growing	markets	in	Asia.	U.S.	markets	have	also	grown	in	real	terms	and	relative	to	GDP.		 	
• The	pools	of	long-term	capital	such	as	pensions	and	insurance	assets	have	grown	in	real	terms	but	have	struggled	to	keep	up	with	rising	GDP	outside	of	 the	 U.S.,	 particularly	 in	 Asia.	 Meanwhile,	 high	 net	 worth	 individuals	have	got	wealthier.		
• Investors	 and	 issuers	 have	 shifted	 significantly	 from	 equities	 to	 bonds	over	the	past	decade.	Stock	markets	have	shrunk	relative	to	GDP	in	every	region	 outside	 the	 U.S.,	 but	 global	 corporate	 and	 government	 bond	markets	have	grown	by	two	thirds	in	real	terms.		
• IPO	activity	has	halved	in	real	terms	over	the	past	decade	but	corporate	bond	issuance	has	more	than	doubled	in	real	terms.	Global	M&A	activity	has	shrunk	by	a	 third	relative	to	GDP	and	 investment	banking	 fees	have	dropped	by	a	quarter	in	real	terms.		
• Trading	volumes	have	continued	to	rise	over	the	past	decade.	Relative	to	GDP,	equity	trading	and	corporate	bond	trading	have	increased	by	more	than	 a	 quarter,	while	 derivatives	 and	 FX	 trading	 have	 increased	 in	 real	terms	by	around	a	fifth.	Exchanges	have	benefited	from	this	growth:	they	are	 the	 only	 sector	 to	 emerge	 from	 the	 crisis	 both	 bigger	 and	 more	profitable.		
• Hedge	funds,	private	equity	and	venture	capital	have	flourished	over	the	past	 decade	with	 a	 surge	 in	 assets	 under	management	 in	 real	 terms	 of	between	 70%	 and	 110%.	 The	 persistence	 of	 high	 fees	 has	 not	 been	matched	by	performance	(except	for	venture	capital).		
• The	 international	 framework	 for	 supervision	 and	 regulation	 has	 been	transformed	by	the	crisis,	with	more	than	30	new	agencies	set	up	in	the	EU	and	U.S.	alone	since	2006.	Budgets	at	regulators	have	 increased	by	a	third	in	real	terms	and	staff	numbers	are	up	by	40%.			
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3.	How	did	the	U.S.	household’	mortgage	borrowing	crisis	develop	over	the	
last	two	decades?			
	Unlike	the	banking	and	the	 larger	financial	sector,	 the	household	sector	had	no	support	 in	 dealing	with	 its	 financial	 problems	when	 they	 occurred	 from	 2003	onwards.		Two	 tables	 can	 demonstrate	 the	 predicament	 of	 what	 happened	 to	 mortgage	borrowers	in	the	U.S..	The	first	table	deals	with	volume	growth	in	new	mortgage	lending	per	time	period,	new	housing	starts,	actual	average	house	prices,	median	nominal	 incomes	 and	 the	 affordable	 house	 prices	 based	 on	 nominal	 income	growth.	 The	 table	 covers	 the	 period	1996-2016.	 The	 second	 table	 sets	 out	 the	effects	 on	 households	when	 they	 got	 into	 payment	 difficulties:	 the	 foreclosure	filings,	 completed	 foreclosures	 and	 home	 repossessions	 over	 the	 period	 2004-2016.		
	
Table	1:	The	developments	of	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending,	the	annual	housing	starts,	the	average	U.S.	home	sales	price,	the	nominal	median	income	of	households	and	U.S.	home	sale	prices	based	on	such	incomes					
	
Year	
	
1	
Volume	of	
Home	mortgage	
Lending	
X	U.S.$	billion	
	
2	
Annual	
Housing	starts	
X	thousands	
3	
Average	U.S.	
Home	sales	
price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
4	
Median	
Household	
Nominal	
Income	
X	U.S.	dollars	
5	
Income	
Affordability	
House	price	
X	U.S.	dollars	
1996	 329	 1,370	 166,400	 35,492	 	
1997	 341	 1,566	 176,200	 37,005	 173,494	
1998	 437	 1,792	 181,900	 38,885	 182,308	
1999	 524	 1,708	 195,600	 40,696	 190,798	
2000	 544	 1,532	 207,000	 41,990	 196,864	
2001	 685	 1,568	 213,200	 42,228	 197,980	
2002	 907	 1,788	 228,700	 42,409	 198,828	
2003	 1,112	 2,057	 246,300	 43,318	 203,089	
2004	 1,211	 2,042	 274,500	 44,334	 207,852	
2005	 1,351	 1,994	 297,000	 46,326	 217,233	
2006	 1,327	 1,649	 305,900	 48,201	 226,025	
2007	 1,057	 1,037	 313,600	 50,233	 235,553	
2008	 319	 560	 292,600	 50,303	 235,881	
2009	 186	 581	 270,900	 49,777	 233,414	
2010	 -167	 539	 272,900	 49,276	 231,065	
2011	 104	 694	 263,400	 50,054	 234,713	
2012	 105	 976	 285,400	 51,017	 239,229	
2013	 223	 1,010	 319,300	 53,585	 251,271	
2014	 312	 1,081	 312,500	 53,657	 251,609	
2015	 407	 1,160	 352,500	 55,775	 261,541	
2016	 596	 1,226	 384,000	 59,149	 277,362		
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Table	 2:	 Foreclosure	 filings,	 foreclosures	 and	 home	 repossessions	 in	 the	
U.S.	2004-20164		
Year							Foreclosure						Completed												Home		
																Filings																Foreclosures								Repossessions			2016	 					956,864	 								427,997	 														203,108	2015	 		1,083,572	 								569.825	 														449,900	2014	 		1,117,426	 								575,378	 														327,069	2013	 		1,369,405	 								921,064	 														463,108	2012	 		2,300,000	 					2,100,000	 														700,000	2011	 		3,920,418	 					3,580,000	 											1,147,000	2010	 		3,843,548	 					3,500,000	 											1,125,000	2009	 		3,457,643	 					2,920,000	 														945,000	2008	 		3,019,482	 					2,350,000	 														679,000	2007	 		2,203,295	 					1,260,000	 														489,000	2006	 		1,566,398	 								973,000	 														356,000	2005	 		1,126,637	 								773,000	 														312,000	2004	 					948,031	 								582,000	 														274,000			In	a	paper	by	this	author:	“Why	it	makes	economic	sense	to	help	the	have-nots	in	times	of	a	financial	crisis”5,	it	was	argued	that	there	are	two	methods	to	measure	the	affordability	of	home	mortgages:	 the	 income-based	method	and	the	market	based	one.			The	income-based	method	takes	as	a	base	year	1996	and	subsequently	calculates		the	mortgage	amount	a	median	 income	household	can	 incur	 in	 following	years	on	 basis	 of	 nominal	 income	 growth.	 If	 incomes	 grow,	 mortgage	 amounts	 can	grow	 in	 line	with	 such	 income	 growth.	 The	main	 characteristic	 of	 the	 income-based	 method	 is	 that	 the	 percentage	 of	 income	 available	 for	 consumption	 of	other	goods	and	services	does	not	fluctuate	much	over	time.		The	market-based	method	is	based	on	the	actual	average	U.S.	home	sales	price.	This	 price	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 demand	 for	 housing	 	 -as	 owner-occupier	 or	 as	renter-	 and	 the	 supply	 delivered	 by	 the	 homebuilders.	 A	 major	 factor	 in	 this	supply	 and	 demand	 equation	 is	 the	 volume	 of	 funds	 made	 available	 by	 the	banking	sector.		In	2003,	for	instance,	the	market	-based	price	of	an	average	home	was	5.68	times	the	nominal	median	household	income	as	compared	to	1997,	when	it	was	4.76.																																																										4	https://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/	5	https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/82035/	
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																																																																			Central	banks	strategies	after	the	financial	crisis©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			The	latest	available	data	for	2016	showed	that	this	ratio	has	further	deteriorated	to	 6.49	 times.	 In	 the	 U.K.	 the	 house	 price	 to	 earnings	 ratio	 is	 currently	 at	 7.2	times,	which	 is	 almost	 at	 a	 record	high.	However,	unlike	 in	 the	U.S.,	many	U.K.	households	are	on	a	variable	mortgage	rate.		For	 households	 to	 commit	 to	 pay	 back	 an	 amount	 equal	 to	 at	 least	 6	 years	 of	100%	of	their	income	over	a	30-year	time	period	is	an	enormous	decision	and	it	is	 way	 too	 important	 to	 have	 bankers	 undermine	 such	 decision	 by	 excessive	lending	practices,	either	in	volume	or	in	softening	terms	and	conditions.		As	 an	 example,	 by	 2003,	 new	 U.S.	 mortgage	 borrowers	 had	 to	 borrow	 an	additional	 $43,211	 to	 acquire	 a	 home,	 compared	 to	 1997	 borrowers	 as	 the	market	price	had	grown	faster	than	the	income-based	method	would	allow.	For	the	2003	homebuyers	this	was	equal	to	a	year’s	gross	income.	If	households	can	afford	to	spend	40%	of	their	income	on	housing	costs,	the	additional	debt	burden	translates	in	2.5	times	the	amount	which	equals	$108,000	in	future	income	and	debt	commitments.		The	fact	that	the	average	mortgage	borrower	in	2003	had	to	spend	substantially	more	 on	 servicing	 a	 mortgage	 debt	 then	 a	 similar	 household	 in	 1997,	 had	substantial	 consequences	 for	 the	2003’s	 households’	 group	 ability	 to	 spend	on	other	goods	and	services.	The	average	 income	growth	 for	households	buying	a	home	in	1997	and	2003	were	similar.	This	leads	to	the	conclusion	that	the	2003	mortgage	borrowers	were	left	with	less	disposable	income	after	mortgage	debt	servicing	than	the	1997	group	of	households.	This	erosion	of	income	levels	had	already	 started	 in	 1999	 and	 by	 2003	 the	 actual	 average	 house	 sale	 price	exceeded	the	income	based	affordability	house	price	by	21.27%.		No	action	was	taken	 to	 stop	 this	 erosion	 in	 disposable	 income	 levels,	 therefore	 by	 2007,	 the	2007	 homebuyers	 group	 had	 to	 incur	 an	 extra	 debt	 of	 1.5	 times	 their	 annual	median	income	level	to	get	on	to	the	housing	ladder	compared	to	the	1997	group	of	buyers.	The	groups	of	households	affected	by	income	erosion	grew	with	every	passing	year	from	1999.		The	buffers	were	reached	for	at	least	1.56	million	households	by	2006	as	table	2	illustrates.	These	buffers	increased	substantially	for	larger	and	larger	groups	of	households	 from	 2007-2011.	 Only	 by	 2012	 did	 the	 numbers	 start	 to	 drop	 of.		Only	by	2016	did	the	number	of	foreclosure	filings	equal	the	numbers	of	2004,	a	twelve-year	adjustment	period,	but	the	adjustment	came	at	a	substantial	cost	to	the	homeowners.		The	 fact	 is	 that	 not	 only	 home	 mortgage	 borrowers,	 but	 also	 renters	 were	affected	in	their	disposable	incomes.	This	is	well	illustrated	in	the	annual	report																																																																																																							
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																																																																																																																																																																																																				Central	banks	strategies	after	the	financial	crisis©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning			on	 the:	 “State	 of	 the	Nation’s	Housing	 2017”	 published	 by	 the	 Joint	 Center	 for	Housing	Studies	of	Harvard	University6.	On	renters	it	states:			
“By	the	Housing	Vacancy	Survey’s	count,	the	number	of	renter	households	rose	by	 600,000	 from	 2015	 to	 2016,	 marking	 12	 consecutive	 years	 of	 growth	 and	lifting	net	growth	since	2005	to	nearly	10	million.	Although	still	solid,	the	level	of	renter	growth	in	2016	did	represent	a	sharp	deceleration	from	the	previous	two	years.	Some	43.3	million	households	currently	rent	their	housing,	including	more	than	80	million	adults	and	families	with	over	30	million	children.	The	renter	share	of	US	 households	 now	 stands	 at	 a	 50-year	 high	 of	 37	 per	 cent,	 up	 more	 than	 5	percentage	points	from	2004,	when	the	homeownership	rate	peaked.	The	 surge	 in	 rental	 demand	 that	 began	 in	 2005	 is	 broad-based	 and	 includes	several	 types	 of	 households	 that	 traditionally	 prefer	 homeownership—in	particular,	 older	 adults,	 families	 with	 children,	 and	 high-income	 households.	These	 changes	 reflect	 a	 number	 of	 factors,	 including	 the	 fallout	 from	 the	mortgage	foreclosure	crisis	as	well	as	larger	demographic	shifts,	particularly	the	ageing	of	the	US	population. Indeed,	 older	 households	 aged	 55	 and	 over	 accounted	 for	 fully	 44	 per	 cent	 of	renter	 household	 growth	 between	 2005	 and	 2016.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 share	 of	renters	in	this	age	group	increased	to	27	per	cent	last	year—up	from	22	per	cent	in	 2005.	 Renters	 under	 age	 35	were	 responsible	 for	 the	 next	 largest	 share	 of	growth	 (25	 per	 cent),	 driven	 primarily	 by	 their	 delayed	 entry	 into	 the	 home	buying	market.	Meanwhile,	households	 in	 the	35–44	age	 range	 -the	group	 that	experienced	 the	 sharpest	 drop	 in	 home-ownership	 after	 the	 housing	 crash-contributed	14	per	cent	of	renter	household	growth	in	2005–2016	despite	a	net	loss	of	households	in	this	age	range.	Families	with	children	are	also	increasingly	likely	to	rent	rather	than	own	their	homes.	The	share	of	 these	households	 living	 in	rental	housing	 jumped	 from	32	per	 cent	 in	 2005	 to	 39	 per	 cent	 in	 2016,	 accounting	 for	 22	 per	 cent	 of	 renter	household	growth	over	this	period.	The	large	increases	in	renting	among	families	with	 children	 reflect	 high	 rates	 of	 foreclosure-induced	 exits	 from	homeownership	in	combination	with	lower	rates	of	home	buying	since	the	Great	Recession.	As	a	result	of	these	shifts,	the	share	of	children	living	in	rental	housing	climbed	from	29	per	cent	in	2005	to	36	per	cent	in	2016.”			The	same	report	concludes	that	currently	lower	income	families	pay	more	than	50%	 of	 their	 incomes	 for	 housing	 costs;	 they	 are	 the	 severe	 burdened.	 In	 the	lowest	 income	 group	with	 incomes	 under	 $15,000	 annually,	 the	 percentage	 is	70%,	for	incomes	under	$30,000	it	is	38%.																																																									6	http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/state_nations_housing	
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                                                                                      Central banks strategies after the financial crisis© Drs Kees De Koning	One	 may	 conclude	 from	 the	 above	 that	 the	 rental	 group	 of	 households	 were	under	 the	 same	 income	pressures	 as	 the	 owners	 groups,	 especially	 from	2005	onwards.	Whether	affected	by	an	income-house	price	gap	for	new	homeowners	using	a	mortgage,	or	renting	a	home	when	house	prices	and	rents	were	going	up	faster	 than	 incomes,	 both	 groups	 suffered	 the	 same	 deterioration	 in	 their	disposable	 income	 levels.	 The	most	 pronounced	were	 the	 effects	 on	 the	 lower	income	classes	as	the	2017	State	of	the	Nations	Housing	study	illustrates.	
4	Some	further	considerations	
4.1	The	income-house	price	gap	illustrated	Probably	the	best	way	to	illustrate	the	income-house	price	gap	is	with	the	help	of	table	3.	Table	3	sets	out	the	costs	of	a	30	year	fixed	rate	mortgage	as	provided	by	Freddie	Mac,	with	a	10%	down	payment	and	an	equal	annual	instalment	for	the	principal	amount.	
Table	3:	A	comparison	between	the	costs	of	an	income	and	a	market	based	
house	price		
Year	
	
Interest	
rate	
%	
House		
Price	
U.S.$	 Down	Payment	U.S.$	 Interest	Plus	Principal	
U.S.$	
Median	
Nominal	
Income	
U.S.$	
Percent	
Of	
Income	
%	1997		 7.60	 173,494	 17,349	 17,092	 37,005	 46.2	2003*		 5.63	 203,089	 20,309	 16,384	 43,318	 37.8	2003**		 5.63	 246,300	 24,630	 19,869	 43,318	 45.9/55.8	2006*		 6.41	 226,025	 22,603	 19,820	 48,201	 41.1	2006**		 6.41	 305,900	 30,590	 26,824	 48,201	 55.7/72.2	*Indicates	an	income	based	house	price	**	Indicates	market	based	house	price	The	 key	 conclusion	 that	 can	be	drawn	 from	 table	 3	 is	 linked	 to	 the	 total	 costs	outlay	that	is	required	for	a	median	nominal	income	family	to	get	onto	the		
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                                                                                          Central banks strategies after the financial crisis© Drs Kees De Koning	property	 ladder.	 In	 2003,	 the	 income	 based	 house	 price	 method	 would	 have	required	 a	 household	 to	 come	 up	 with	 $36,693	 in	 order	 to	 buy	 an	 averaged	priced	home.	For	the	next	29	years	the	outlay	would	have	been	$16,384.	Based	on	 the	market	 based	 average	 home	 sales	 price,	 the	 outlay	 for	 a	 family	 would	have	been	$44,499	in	2003	and	$19,869	thereafter.	For	2006,	the	income-based	method	would	lead	to	an	outlay	of	$46,423	in	that	year,	while	the	market-based	house	 price	 would	 have	 required	 $57,414	 plus	 $7,004	 more	 than	 the	 income	based	method	for	mortgage	servicing	interest	and	principal	for	the	next	29	years.	Incomes	can	only	be	spent	ones.	If	an	income	is	allocated	to	buy	a	home,	it	cannot	be	 spend	 on	 other	 goods	 and	 services.	 Therefore	 the	 costs	 of	 acquiring	 and	servicing	the	debt	for	a	home,	restricts	homebuyers	in	their	disposable	incomes	to	acquire	other	goods	and	services.	Renters	are	also	affected	as	rents	follow	the	market	values	of	homes	in	many	cases.	The	 character	 of	 savings	 used	 for	 a	 down	 payment	 for	 acquiring	 a	 home	 is	different	 from	 freely	available	 savings	 in	bank	accounts	or	other	 liquid	market	instruments.	Savings	allocated	to	down	payments	are	locked	up	in	the	value	of	a	home;	 they	 are	 no	 longer	 accessible	 for	 instant	 consumption.	 If	 a	 homeowner	wants	to	allocate	such	savings	for	consumption	purposes,	the	house	needs	to	be	sold;	 but	 another	 place	 to	 live	 will	 need	 to	 be	 found	 instead,	 with	 all	 costs	attached	to	it.	The	down-payment	savings	also	do	not	get	rewarded	in	the	usual	way	of	having	an	interest	rate	paid	or	receiving	a	dividend.	The	cash-out-flow	is	clear	 when	 it	 happens,	 but	 the	 cash-inflow	 is	 uncertain	 and	 cannot	 easily	 be	converted	 into	 consumption,	 unless	 the	 homeowner	 gets	 a	 substantial	 income	increase	from	other	sources,	like	employment.	There	is	another	major	difference	with	ordinary	 savings.	Once	 the	down	payment	 is	made	 from	 the	buyer	 to	 the	seller	 and	 the	 lender	 transfers	 the	 remainder	 sum	 to	 the	 seller,	 the	mortgage	contract	will	 stipulate	 that	 any	 future	home	 sale	proceeds	will	 first	have	 to	be	used	 to	 settle	 the	mortgage	 loan,	 before	 any	money	 is	 transferred	 back	 to	 the	home	owner.	In	other	words,	the	down-payment	savings	are	subordinated	to	the	lender’s	legal	claims.	It	 is	 for	 this	 reason	 that	 in	 table	 3,	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 down-payment	cash	outlay	between	 the	 income-based	method	 and	 the	market-based	one,	 has	been	 added	 as	 an	 extra	 cost.	 The	 result	 shows	 that	 the	market-based	method	already	 requires	 55.8%	 of	 the	 annual	 income	 of	 the	 homebuyer	 in	 2003	 and	72.2%	by	2006	What	this	calculation	shows	is	that	while	the	interest	movement	helps	somewhat	when	long-term	rates	come	down,	the	divergence	of	the	actual	house	prices	over	the	affordable	ones	played	the	key	role	in	lowering	the	disposable	incomes	of	all	new	mortgagors	in	2003	and	even	more	so	in	the	years	after	2003.	The	collective	volume	of	mortgage	 lending	 is	 to	 be	 blamed,	 not	 so	much	 the	 level	 of	 interest	charged.		
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                                                                                       Central banks strategies after the financial crisis© Drs Kees De Koning	In	 the	 comparisons	 used	 in	 the	 Harvard’s	 State	 of	 the	 Nations	 Housing	 Study	2017,	utility	costs	are	included	as	part	of	the	housing	costs.	If	this	were	done	for	the	median	household	in	above	example,	in	2003,	the	allocation	to	housing	costs	(mortgage	plus	utilities)	would	well	have	exceeded	60%	of	their	annual	income,	putting	them	in	the	“severe	burdened”	category	of	households.	The	30-year	mortgage	rates	as	charged	by	Freddie	Mac	did	not	come	down	until	2009.	The	rates	were	5.84%	in	2004,	5.87%	in	2005,	6.41%	in	2006,	6.34%	in	2007	and	6.03%	in	2008.	What	did	come	down	was	the	short-term	effective	Fed	funds	rate,	but	the	short-term	rates	diverged	strongly	from	the	long	term	ones	in	2002,	2003,	2004	and	2005.	The	short-term	rate	hikes	in	2006	and	2007	made	very	little	difference	to	the	30	year	fixed	rates.	The	 conclusion	 to	 be	 drawn	 from	 the	 above	 is	 that	when	 the	margin	 between	market-based	house	prices	and	income-based	ones	diverge,	with	the	earlier	ones	growing	 more	 rapidly	 than	 the	 latter	 ones,	 whole	 sections	 of	 households	 are	worse	off	than	their	counterparts	who	bought	homes	in	earlier	years:	worse	off	means	 in	 this	 case,	 having	 less	 disposable	 income	 available	 for	 general	consumption	 purposes.	 Such	 a	 shift	 negatively	 affects	 current	 and	 future	economic	growth	levels.	
4.2	The	adjustment	process	The	Bank	of	England	in	its	latest	2017	Financial	Stability	Report7	has	developed	a	 diagram	 of	 a	 “self-reinforcing	 feed	 back	 loop”.	 It	 shows	 the	 potential	relationship	between	an	adverse	house	price	fall,	its	collateral	effect,	the	reaction	of	 the	 banking	 community	 in	 reducing	 the	 supply	 of	 credit,	 the	 expectation	 of	further	house	price	drops	and	“fire	sales”	and	the	reinforcement	of	a	house	price	shock.	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                          
 
 																																																								7	http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/fsr/2017/jun.aspx	
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	The	adverse	shock	in	the	case	of	the	U.S.	housing	markets	occurred	already	from	2003	to	2007,	when	the	volume	of	mortgage	lending	and	the	softening	of	lending	standards	 led	 to	 households	 being	 exposed	 to	 new	mortgage	 loans,	 nearly	 all	exceeding	their	growth	in	income	levels.	By	2006	the	level	of	foreclosure	filings	was	up	by	65%	over	2004.	This	process	continued	to	well	into	2012,	before	the	levels	 dropped	 below	 the	 2006	 levels.	 Average	 U.S.	 home	 sales	 price	 reached	their	peak	in	2007	at	$313,600,	dropped	to	$263,400	in	2011	and	only	by	2013			exceeded	 the	 2007	 peak	 for	 the	 first	 time	 since	 the	 financial	 crisis	when	 they	reached	$319,300.		The	phenomenon	of	 the	 substantial	 drop	 in	new	housing	 starts	 commenced	 in	2007	when	new	starts	dropped	to	1.037	million	from	the	level	of	2006	of	1.649	million.	 By	 2008	 new	 housing	 starts	 dropped	 to	 560	 thousand	 and	 hovered	around	this	 figure	 to	2011.	Only	by	2016	did	 this	 level	return	to	1.226	million,	which	was	still	below	the	1996	level,	some	20	years	earlier.	The	 most	 disturbing	 statistic	 is	 the	 number	 of	 home	 repossessions.	 Between	2006	and	2014	in	total	6.23	million	homes	were	repossessed.	This	is	more	than	the	 five	years	 total	 of	new	housing	 starts	between	2012	and	2016.	 It	 is	 all	 the	more	disturbing	as	the	need	for	new	homes	is	based	on	population	growth	and	some	other	factors	as	family	size	and	location	issues.	The	U.S.	population	growth	level	between	April	2010	and	April	2017	was	16.029	million	people,	or		
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                                                                                            Central banks strategies after the financial crisis© Drs Kees De Koning	translated	 into	 households	 of	 3.14	 persons	 per	 household	 as	 5.1	 million	 new	households	over	this	period.	The	home	repossessions	had	a	dramatic	impact	on	house	price	levels	and	on	new	housing	starts	and	of	course	on	the	financial	status	of	nearly	all	households	at	or	below	the	median	income	level.	The	 main	 conclusion	 about	 the	 adjustment	 process	 is	 that	 it	 was	 based	 on	contract	 law	 –	 the	 laws	 covering	 home	mortgages	 –	 rather	 than	 on	 economic	measures.	
4.3	Policy	actions	after	the	financial	crisis	
• Lowering	 of	 interest	 rates.	 The	 objective	 of	 increasing	 or	 lowering	short-term	interest	rates	is	to	slow	down	or	speed	up	economic	activity.	When	rates	come	down,	on	the	supply	side,	such	action	helps	producers	to	 reduce	 costs	 and	 perhaps	 expand	 production	 capacity.	 On	 the	consumer	 demand	 side,	 the	 situation	 is	 completely	 different.	 The	households	 that	 have	 an	 income	 of	 say	 more	 than	 twice	 the	 median	nominal	 income	 level,	 would	 in	 most	 cases	 not	 enter	 into	 a	 loan	agreement	for	buying	consumer	goods,	 irrespective	of	the	level	of	short-term	interest	rates.	The	groups	of	households	with	an	income	of	less	than	twice	the	median	level	may	resort	to	short-term	borrowings.	In	line	with	the	income–house	price	gap	situation,	between	2003	and	2007,	mortgage	borrowers	were	in	too	parlour	a	state	to	enter	into	any	borrowings	on	top	of	their	existing	obligations	and	so	were	the	renters.	Added	to	this,	more	than	 7	 million	 people	 lost	 their	 jobs	 between	 June	 2006	 and	 October	2009.	That	group	was	also	in	an	equally	unable	to	borrow	their	way	out	of	financial	problems.	 In	respect	of	 the	 lowering	of	 the	 long-term	rates	 the	corporate	sector	switched	from	issuing	equity	capital	to	corporate	bonds	over	 the	 years	 after	 2008.	 The	 collective	 reaction	 from	 the	 household	sector	 to	 the	 lower	 interest	 rates	 rather	 than	economy-boosting	 actions	was	to	retrench	and	reduce	the	level	of	outstanding	mortgage	debt	to	the	tune	of	$1.28	trillion	over	the	period	2008-2014,	or	nearly	12%	below	its	peak	in	20088.	The	total	level	of	consumer	borrowings	came	down	$2.643	trillion	 in	 Q3	 2008	 to	 $2.478	 trillion	 in	 Q2	 2010.	 Only	 by	 Q2	 2011	 it	regained	the	level	of	Q3	20089.	Clearly,	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 an	 interest	 rate	 drop	 in	 achieving	 its	 core	objective	-both	long	and	short-term	rates-	depends	heavily	on	the	level	of	indebtedness	of	households	at	a	median	and	lower	income	level	and	how	these	 households	 were	 affected	 by	 the	 income	 gap	 created	 by	 the	diverging	market	and	income	based	house	prices.	
																																																								8	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/HMLBSHNO	9	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CCLBSHNO	
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• Liquidity	supply:	this	helped	banks	and	some	insurance	companies	as	in	the	U.K.,	where	a	£50	billion	rescue	package	was	devised.	It	was	however	aimed	 at	 and	 limited	 to	 the	 financial	 sector.	 No	 liquidity	 supply	 system	was	in	operation	for	individual	households.		
• Quantitative	easing:	the	act	of	buying	up	government	debt	and,	as	in	the	U.S.,	 also	 mortgage	 bonds,	 provided	 relief	 but	 principally	 for	 investors	holding	 such	 bonds.	 	 Of	 course,	 it	 helped	 governments	 also	 in	 funding	their	 debts.	 For	 companies	 it	 was	 a	 reason	 to	 lean	 toward	 issuance	 of	company	 bonds	 rather	 than	 more	 equity.	 For	 households	 in	 debt	 or	having	 taken	 on	 new	 debt	 in	 the	 form	 of	mortgages	 before	 2007,	 their	financial	status	had	deteriorated	so	much	that	the	lowering	of	long-term	interest	 rates	 on	 mortgages	 was	 of	 no	 use.	 Added	 to	 this,	 the	 U.S.	unemployment	 rate	 more	 than	 doubled	 between	 June	 2006	 when	 the	unemployment	rate	was	4.6%	and	October	2009	when	it	became	10.0%.	It	took	until	November	2016	before	the	unemployment	level	returned	to	4.6%.	 What	 has	 been	 poorly	 documented	 has	 been	 the	 correlation	between	unemployment	rates	and	foreclosure	proceedings.	In	April	2006	the	 actual	 number	 of	 unemployed	 (for	 15	 weeks	 or	 longer)	 was	 2.083	million	persons.	 	By	April	2010	 it	had	 risen	 to	9.130	million.	More	 than	seven	million	people	were	laid	off	during	this	period.	If	studies	are	right,	in	 that	 45%	 of	 unemployed	 could	 no	 longer	 afford	 their	 mortgage	payments,	then	over	4	million	foreclosures	can	already	be	explained	from	this	cause	alone.	The	U.S.	 situation	evolved	 in	 exactly	 the	manner	 as	 spelled	out	by	 the	Bank	of	England’s	feedback	loop.	
	
5.	Why	did	central	banks	not	foresee	the	financial	crisis?	Banks	and	most	authorities	in	central	banks	relied	heavily	on	the	market	price	of	homes.	 The	 security	 provided	 by	 higher	 and	 higher	 house	 prices	 provided	healthy	 looking	 ratios	 of	 loans	 to	 values.	 As	 Dr	 Bernanke	 mentions	 in	 afore	mentioned	publication,	at	social	occasions	 in	California,	many	people	discussed	the	values	of	their	properties.	What	was	overlooked,	was	that	in	the	U.S.	by	2003,	the	 loans	 to	 values	 were	 deviating	 sharply	 from	 the	 loans	 to	 income	considerations.			
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                                                                           Central banks strategies after the financial crisis© Drs Kees De Koning	House	prices	are	the	result	of	how	much	money	is	allocated	to	the	buying	power	for	homes.	By	2003,	the	volume	of	new	mortgage	lending	had	increased	by	326%	over	the	level	of	1997.	This	increase	in	buying	power,	strongly	enhanced	by	the	volume	of	new	mortgages	granted,	did	not	result	in	the	volume	of	new	housing	starts	 to	 go	 up	 with	 anything	 like	 the	 326%,	 in	 effect	 the	 new	 housing	 starts	increased	by	31%,	very	respectable	in	its	own	right,	but	far	from	the	money	side	of	 326%.	 As	 a	 consequence	 in	 2003,	 house	 prices,	 were,	 on	 average,	 $43,211	more	than	the	income-based	price	could	afford.	For	a	median	household	income,	it	meant	that	an	increase	of	100%	of	a	one-year	median	nominal	income	had	to	be	financed.		Such	a	claim	on	household’s	incomes	does	not	come	for	free.	It	meant	that	home	buyers	 and	 renters	 in	2003,	were	 a	 lot	worse	off	 in	 terms	of	 freely	disposable	income	than	their	counterparts	in	1997.	This	is	especially	true	for	households	at	or	below	the	median	income	level.	The	deterioration	in	disposable	incomes	was	a	gradual	process	as	tables	1	and	3	indicate.	What	 should	 be	 stated	 is	 that	 in	 2003,	 U.S.	 based	 banks	 and	 other	 finance	companies	competed	for	their	mortgage	loans	to	be	accepted	by	the	buyers.	No	single	bank	was	responsible	for	the	collective	lending	level	that	was	reached	in	2003.		All	banks	together	were	responsible	for	the	level	of	lending.	Competition	between	banks,	added	with	incentive	schemes	for	bank	employees	who	sold	the	most	mortgages,	does	not	square	easily	with	an	income-based	lending	policy.		One	 may	 wonder	 whether	 competition	 between	 banks	 will	 ever	 lead	 to	 an	income-based	approach	being	applied.	The	experience	of	2004-2008	in	the	U.S.	does	 not	 create	 confidence	 as	 softer	 and	 softer	 terms	 and	 conditions	 were	accepted	 in	order	 to	get	households	 to	sign	up	to	mortgages.	The	spike	 in	sub-prime	mortgages	started	in	2004	and	lasted	to	2007.	It	could	not	have	come	at	a	worse	time	for	 individual	households	and	for	the	U.S.	economy	as	a	whole.	The	internationalisation	of	 the	 funding	sources	 for	U.S.	home	mortgages	spread	 the	risks	 around	 the	world.	 The	 “Great	 Recession”	 spread	 its	 tentacles	 around	 the	globe.	Dr.	Bernanke	describes	in	his	book:	“The	Courage	to	Act”10,	how	divided	the	U.S.	regulatory	 authorities	 were	 in	 2008	 and	 that	 no	 single	 authority	 had	responsibility	 for	 the	banking	and	 financial	 sector	as	a	whole.	Authorities	have	changed,	but	one	can	still	wonder	whether	the	Fed	has	the	tools	today	to	stop	a	new	 wave	 of	 sub-prime	mortgages.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 the	current	 level	 of	 “normal”	mortgages	 at	 6.49	 times	 the	median	nominal	 income	could	pose																																																																																																																																10	http://books.wwnorton.com/books/detail.aspx?ID=4294989041	
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																																																																						Central banks strategies after the financial crisis© Drs Kees De Koning	a	 threat	 to	 future	 economic	 growth	 levels.	 Prime	 and	 sub-prime	 are	 relative	terms!	There	is	another	element	worth	mentioning:	the	Phillips	curve	linking	the	level	of	employment	with	the	rate	of	(consumer	price)	inflation.	Central	banks	in	their	models	have	been	guided	by	this	curve.	However	since	2008,	the	results	of	this	link	 have	 been	 very	 mixed	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 many	 economists	 have	expressed	their	doubts	about	the	continued	relevance	of	the	curve.	Perhaps	the	curve	should	be	rephrased	in	that	rather	than	two	elements	to	be	considered:	the	demand-pull	 and	 the	 cost-push	 ones,	 a	 new	 element	 is	 added:	 the	 demand-income	gap	option.		The	 latter	 option	 occurs	when	 the	market	 price	 of	 homes	 exceeds	 the	 income	based	 home	 price	 over	 time,	 causing	 households	 incomes	 available	 for	consumption	 to	slow	down	as	a	higher	percentage	of	 their	 incomes	 is	used	 for	debt	servicing.	
6.	A	possible	solution:	a	liquidity	scheme	for	households	The	 tools	 available	 to	 central	 banks	 to	 counter	 the	 gap	between	market-based	and	 income-based	 house	 prices	 fall	 short	 of	 what	 is	 required	 to	 achieve	 an	adjustment	period	with	the	minimum	of	economic	distortion	for	households.	The	principal	reason	is	that,	by	the	time	the	financial	crisis	occurred,	the	central	banks	were	no	longer	in	charge.	The	lawyers	took	over,	and	they	still	are	acting	on	behalf	of	the	banking	sector.	Foreclosure	filings,	completed	foreclosures	and	home	repossessions	are	a	backward	way	 to	solve	a	 financial	 crisis	as	 the	 “feed	back	loop”,	so	aptly	developed	by	the	Bank	of	England,	shows.	One	side	effect	of	the	crisis	was	that	lawyers	were	also	working	for	the	U.S.	government	to	penalise	the	banks.	What	seems	missing	is	a	need	for	a	change	in	economic	philosophy.	Rather	than	just	 prioritising	 saving	 the	 banking	 sector,	 even	 when	 it	 was	 their	 collective	actions	 which	 caused	 the	 financial	 crisis	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	consider	 an	 additional	 model	 of	 economic	 adjustment:	 assisting	 the	 lower	income	classes	in	meeting	their	mortgage	loan	or	rental	obligations.	This	action	may	be	beyond	the	remit	of	central	banks,	but	not	beyond	governments.	The	U.S.	government	 tried	 with	 a	 Home	 Affordable	 Refinance	 Program	 (Harp)	 and	 a	Home	Affordable	Modification	Program	(Hamp)	.	However	these	programs	were	not	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 an	 income	 gap,	 caused	 by	 the	divergence	of	house	prices	and	income	developments.	It	is	a	fundamental	mistake	to	rely	upon	the	legal	system	to	resolve	an	economic	malfunction.	The	mistake	 in	question	was	 that	over	 the	period	2002-2008,	U.S.	households	 had	 to	 dedicate	 an	 ever-increasing	 percentage	 of	 their	 incomes	 to	servicing	mortgage	debts	 or	 pay	 higher	 rents.	 This	 should	not	 have	 happened.	However	it	did.	The	debt	recovery	process	did	not	use	economic	means	to	solve		
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																																																																					Central banks strategies after the financial crisis© Drs Kees De Koning	the	 crisis,	 but	 legal	 means	 of	 foreclosure	 filings,	 completed	 foreclosures	 and	home	 repossessions.	 The	Bank	of	 England’s	 feedback	 loop	worked	perfectly	 in	this	 way,	 to	 the	 great	 detriment	 of	 individual	 households.	 With	 falling	 house	prices,	 households	 had	 even	 less	 of	 a	 chance	 of	 any	 recovery	 of	 accumulated	savings	in	the	home.	The	poor	were	forced	into	deeper	poverty.	As	stated	above,	this	was	not	due	to	a	fault	of	their	own	making.	There	 is	 another	 option,	 an	 economic	 one	 and	 one	 actually	 quite	 similar	 to	providing	 temporary	 liquidity	 to	 the	 banking	 sector,	when	 it	 ran	 into	 financial	problems.	 It	 can	 be	 described	 as	 a	 liquidity	 support	 system	 for	 individual	households.	 In	 a	 previous	 paper:	 “How	 the	 financial	 crisis	 could	 have	 been	averted”11,	 the	writer	 already	 illustrated	 such	 suggestion.	 The	 option	 could	 be	used	when	a	cap	on	mortgage-lending	levels	had	not	been	enforced.	In	such	case	the	 setting	 up	 of	 a	 National	 Mortgage	 Bank	 was	 recommended	 to	 help	households	overcome	their	liquidity	squeeze.	Such	an	NMB	could	act	as	a	lender	of	last	resort	for	individual	households	on	basis	of	sharing	part	of	the	asset	(the	home)	with	the	NMB	for	its	cash-flow	help.	Such	help	should	be	differentiated	for	each	income	class	that	an	individual	household	belongs	to.	Low-income	earners	should	 be	 helped	most.	 This	 is	 not	without	 precedent.	 The	 U.S.	 Home	Owners	Loan	Corporation	had	been	created	for	a	similar	purpose	but	was	disbanded	in	1936.	Had	such	a	Corporation	been	in	existence	in	2007-2008,	it	could	have	done	wonders	 for	 maintaining	 the	 liquidity	 position	 for	 most	 mortgagors	 and	 even	taken	a	subordinated	share	in	the	housing	market	while	mortgage-lending	levels	synced	 with	 nominal	 increases	 in	 median	 household	 incomes.	 Rather	 than	buying	up	mortgage	backed	securities	 to	 the	 tune	of	$1.8	 trillion,	an	assistance	scheme	to	directly	help	households	to	overcome	their	liquidity	pressures	would	have	 been	 a	 much	 more	 effective	 way	 in	 avoiding	 the	 rapid	 increase	 in	unemployment	 levels	and	the	subsequent	spike	 in	U.S.	government	debt	 levels.	Economic	growth	levels	would	also	have	been	higher.	Lenders	should	pay	a	price	to	the	NMB	for	the	reduction	 in	risks	that	 the	NMB	facilitates.	The	borrowers	should	share	–	on	a	subordinated	basis	–	with	the	NMB	some	of	the	wealth	incorporated	in	the	homes. With	the	help	of	an	NMB,	mortgage	borrowers	can	be	helped	–	on	a	temporary	basis-	to	overcome	the	economic	pressures	that	excess	mortgage	lending	levels	have	 created	 for	 them.	The	help	 to	households	 should	 apply	 to	homeowners	 –occupiers	only	and	not	to	landlords.	Liquidity	support	could	also	be	considered	for	the	lower	income	groups,	who	no	longer	were	able	 to	buy	a	home,	but	were	 forced	 into	 the	rental	markets.	Such	help	could	consist	of	a	temporary	rental	support.	Such	a	scheme	would	require	a	change	 in	 the	 law	 as	 the	 beneficiaries	 –	 the	 landlords	 –	would	 be	 required	 to	acknowledge	 such	 support	 by	 allowing	 the	 NMB	 to	 establish	 a	 subordinated	mortgage	on	the	property	for	the	amount	of	help	provided. 																																																								11	https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/77060.html	
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																																																															Central	banks	strategies	after	the	financial	crisis©	Drs	Kees	De	Koning	Moral	 hazard	 issue	 needs	 to	 be	 considered	 in	 the	 context	 of	 such	 a	 liquidity	scheme.	Does	the	benefit	to	a	household	–liquidity	support-	encourage	taking	on	more	borrowing,	or	borrowing	irresponsibly?	The	support	does	come	with	a	cost	for	 the	household:	 a	 transfer	of	part	ownership	over	 the	property	 to	 the	NMB.	The	 gain	 for	 the	 household	 and	 the	 economy	 as	 a	whole	 is	 that	members	 of	 a	household	are	able	to	stay	in	the	home,	rather	than	face	becoming	homeless	at	a	substantial	 cost	 both	 to	 the	 household	 and	 the	 economy.	 The	 gain	 for	 the	banking	sector	 is	 that	a	potentially	doubtful	debtor	remains	current	 in	 its	debt	servicing	obligations.	For	lending	banks	there	is	a	cost	attached	to	it:	a	transfer	of	part	of	the	risk	premium	banks	charge	customers	for	taking	on	mortgage	risks	to	the	NMB.	Both	borrowers	 and	 lenders	 pay	 a	 price.	 For	 renters	 the	 situation	 is	somewhat	different.	They	are	the	victims	of	the	income-house	price	gap	and	they	can	 be	 evicted	 if	 they	 are	 not	 keeping	 up	 with	 rent	 payments.	 Their	 ultimate	penalty	is	also	homelessness.	If	a	liquidity	scheme	included	a	wealth	loss	for	the	landlord	–a	subordinated	mortgage	established	by	the	NMB	equal	to	the	liquidity	support	rendered	to	the	renter-	then	landlords	would	most	likely	not	accept	rent	levels	far	exceeding	the	income	limits	of	the	renter.	If	a	landlord	does	not	like	to	give	up	his	property	rights	 in	this	way,	he	may	be	given	the	option	of	 lowering	the	rent	levels.	For	the	NMB	it	needs	to	be	a	judgment	about	reasonable	levels	of	rents	 compared	 to	 income.	 Liquidity	 support	 for	 renters	 should	 not	 be	 a	guaranteed	 right.	 It	 should	 also	 be	 restricted	 to	 median	 and	 low-income	households	only.	This	solution	is	an	economic,	rather	than	a	legal	one	and	such	a	solution	avoids	the	 feedback	 loop	 effects	 as	 spelled	 out	 by	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	 financial	stability	report.			Drs	Kees	De	Koning	15	November	2017	Chorleywood,	U.K.		
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